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Up to now, academic research has not addressed issues of proof and credibility in the asylum procedure to an extent reflecting its practical importance. This edited volume attempts to fill the void. Academic experts on the theory of evidence, international criminal law, human rights law, refugee law, sociology of law and psychology have contributed chapters exploring both empirical and normative dimensions of evidentiary assessment.

Intro -- Negotiating Asylum: The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and the Common Market of Deflection -- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS -- STRUCTURE -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES -- ABBREVIATIONS -- 1 INTRODUCTION -- 1.1. Reminiscences from a Continuing Past -- 1.1.1 Protecting Communities I -- 1.1.2 Protecting Communities II -- 1.1.3 Protecting Communities Ill -- 1.1.4 The Ambiguity of Hindsight -- 1.2 Identifying the Problem -- 1.3 Delimiting the Problem -- 1.3.1 'Access' -- 1.3.2 'Extraterritorial Protection' -- 1.3.3 'Regulated' -- 1.3.4 'In the European Union' -- 1.4 Identifying Law -- 1.4.1 International Law -- 1.4.1.1 The Concept of 'International Law' -- 1.4.1.2 Sources of International Law -- 1.4.1.3 Normative Hierarchies within International Law -- 1.4.1.4 International Law and Justiciability Advantages -- 1.4.2 The Law of the European Union -- 1.4.2.1 Terminology -- 1.4.2.2 Primary and Secondary Law of the European Union -- 1.4.2.3 EC Law and Union Law: Conceptual Questions -- 1.4.2.4 EC Law: Sources and Normative Hierarchies -- 1.4.2.5 EC Law and Justiciability Advantages -- 1.4.2.6 Union law: Sources, Normative Hierarchies and Justiciability Advantages -- 1.4.2. 7 A Normative Hierarchy between EC Law, Union Law and International Law? -- 1.4.3 Intermediary Conclusion -- 1.5 Determining Law-Methodological Considerations -- 1.5.1 A Triple Dilemma -- 1.5.2 Structuring Conflicts -- 1.5.3 The Legal-technical Level -- 1.5.4 The Qualitative Level -- 1.5.5 The Metalega/ Leve/ -- 1.6 The Structure of Inquiry -- 2 UNIVERSALISM VERSUS PARTICULARISM -- 2.1 Choosing between Torture and Terrorism: Mr. Chahal vs. the U.K. Population -- 2.2 Universalism -- 2.3 Particularism -- 2.4 Human Rights versus Sovereignty -- 2.5 Artefact versus Organism -- 2.6 Meandering Arguments -- 3 DETERMINANTS OF PROTECTION SYSTEMS.

How is access to asylum and other forms of extraterritorial protection regulated in the European Union? Is the EU acquis in these areas in conformity with international law? Which tools does international law offer to solve collisions between both? And, finally, is law capable of bridging the foundational oppositions embedded in migration and asylum issues? This work combines the potential of legal formalism with an analytical framework drawing on political theory. It analyses the argumentative strategies used by international lawyers, and developed them further, exploiting the interpretative methodology of international law as well as elaborate discrimination arguments. The author concludes that deflecting protection seekers by means of visa requirements may constitute a violation of the European Convention of Human Rights, and that the prescriptions of international law oblige Member States to apply the Dublin Convention and the Spanish Protocol in a manner emptying it of its main control functions. The author also shows that burden-sharing remains the pivotal element in the normative dynamics behind the EU acquis, and explains why the European Court of Human Rights must be regarded as the only transnational forum for the legitimate negotiation of asylum in Europe.

Is there a Nordic approach to international law? I argue that a substantive Nordic approach to international law is absent today, and explore why the question of a Nordic international law would emerge today and how the craving for Nordic identity might be overcome. I look into select evidence relating to the use of force, to international recognition and to international humanitarian law to show the material vacuity of contemporary Nordic cooperation in key areas. The epoch of Nordic legal entrepreneurialism taking off during 19th century, Nordic international law is now ending, and non-alignment with it. This brings me to ask how the melancholic longing for a 'Nordic international law' might be transgressed. Here, Andrei Tarkovsky's Nostalghia of 1983 comes in. It confronts us with the question of what imperatives – legal or other – grow from our melancholia for homelands and persons no longer with us.

In the past years, research on military applications of neuroscience has grown in sophistication. We may expect that future neuroweapons will be advertised as resting on the most objective form of human cognition, leading to greater accuracy in targeting and better compliance with the law than traditional weapons. Are states using weapon systems that draw on neuroscience capable of applying IHL to that use? Only at the price of a decision review system so fundamental as to eradicate the temporal advantages neuroweapons are designed to create. I argue that the application of contemporary IHL presupposes that cognition is embodied in one single human being and coupled to language. Neuroweapons spread cognition across humans and machines combined, and largely eliminate the cognitive role of language. Both traits render the distinction between superior and subordinate unstable, therewith disrupting the premises of responsibility under IHL. By consequence, it is impossible to assess whether future uses of these weapons are lawful under IHL.

This text is an inquiry into how the international community is understood in and through international law. My prism for this inquiry shall be the principle of proportionality in international humanitarian law, relating expected civilian losses to anticipated military advantage. To properly understand proportionality, I have to revert to the structure of analogical thinking in the thomistic tradition. Proportionality presupposes a third element to which civilian losses and military advantage can be related. In a first reading, I develop how this tradition of thought might explain the difficulties contemporary IHL doctrine has in understanding proportionality. If military commanders misconceive the third element as the sovereignty of their own state, they will invariably apply the proportionality principle in a paternalistic manner. This would obviate the most rudimentary idea of equality among states and do away with the common of an international community. In a second reading, I shall explore whether this third element could instead be thought of as a demos, while retaining the existing framework of analogical thinking. My argument is that this secularizing replacement is possible. Practically, its consequence would be a radical change in the task of the responsible military commander determining proportionality. That commander would now need to rethink civilians endangered by an attack as a demos whose potentiality must be preserved.

Governments attempting to regulate labour markets and control immigration are confronted with difficult questions. In the past, there was general agreement that the asylum system should not be exploited as a side entrance to the labour market. The two systems—asylum and labour market—were to be planned and maintained separately. But if migration is a prerequisite for asylum, does not increasingly stiffer migration control block escape for those under persecution? Prices for smuggling go up, and smugglers seek new routes, yet irregular migration continues, and the informal labour market flourishes. Here we must ask an irreverent question: is there any point in having both systems? And can the crux of the matter be that both are repeatedly branded as an 'illegal' phenomena which must be 'battled' like enemies? This contribution asks whether the asylum system a way to regulate the informal labour market within the EU?